FIRST
DIVISION
GODOFREDO MORALES,
Petitioner, - versus
- SKILLS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY AND/OR
MAHER DAAS AND MARIVIC DAAS AND/OR WALLAN Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 149285 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: August
30, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals’ Decision[1]
dated
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
On
In
his Position Paper,[6]
petitioner alleged that his employment was illegally terminated on
For
its part, respondent Skills International alleged that it previously deployed
petitioner for work abroad in April 1995 until he came home in July 1996. Later on, petitioner met his new employer at
respondent Skills International’s office in Malate,
On
Petitioner
then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved against him[9]
prompting petitioner to elevate his case to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision now assailed before us, the Court
of Appeals dismissed his Petition for Certiorari with the decretal portion of the Decision stating:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.[10]
In
sustaining the NLRC, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioner’s arguments
were a mere reiteration of those he earlier presented before the NLRC and which
were already passed upon by the latter.[11] The Court of Appeals also held that
petitioner failed to present any basis to support his argument that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving the case in favor of
respondent Skills International.[12]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but this was denied;[13]
hence, the present recourse where petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
erred in its findings that:
a.) There is no formal, valid and signed contract of employment that binds the petitioner and the private respondents;
b.) Petitioner
was hired directly by his foreign employer and was processed as a Balik-Manggagawa; and
c.) Petitioner
did not pay any placement fee and he did not mention that he was deducted
placement fee by the respondent [Skills International].[14]
Petitioner
claims that the relationship between Wallan Al Wallan and respondent Skills International was sufficiently
established when the latter stated in its Position Paper that it was in its
office in Malate, Manila, where petitioner met his
new employer. Petitioner insists that if
Wallan Al Wallan were not
an accredited principal of respondent Skills International, then he had no
business being in the latter’s office.
But since as petitioner and Wallan Al Wallan met each other within the confines of respondent
Skills International’s office, it can be said that respondent Skills
International had a hand in their meeting.
More than this, it was respondent Skills International which handled his
deployment for work abroad as a balik-manggagawa.
Petitioner
also points out that in the medical examination report dated
Likewise,
in the Standard Employment Contract for Various Skills[18]
which petitioner signed, it is stated that his local placement agency is
respondent Skills International while his principal in
In
addition, petitioner maintains that he does not fall within the category of balik-manggagawa as the term refers to “a landbased contract worker who is on vacation or on
emergency leave, and who is returning to the same work site to resume his
employment.”[19] Obviously then, he should not have been
considered as a balik-manggagawa since
he was neither here on vacation nor on emergency leave; instead, he went back
abroad under an entirely new employment contract.
As
for the lack of placement fee he paid to respondent Skills International,
petitioner claims that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals
failed to take notice of the receipt, written in Saudi Arabian language,
showing that his employer abroad deducted 5,000 Saudi Riyals from his salary as
placement fee.[20]
Given
these circumstances, petitioner concludes that respondent Skills International
should be held liable to him for the illegal dismissal perpetuated by its
accredited principal, Wallan Al Wallan,
as provided for under Section [60] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995[21]
which states:
Section
60. Solidary
Liability. - The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency on any and all claims under this Rule shall be
joint and solidary.
This liability shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers.
If
the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers
and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for
the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such
liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or
modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
On
the other hand, respondent Skills International insists that this Petition
should be dismissed as it seeks a review of the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals – a task which clearly does not
fall within the ambit of a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Nevertheless, respondent Skills International
proceeded to address the matters stated in the Petition. It contends that although it had previously
deployed petitioner abroad, such deployment was for its accredited principal,
the Saudi Automotive Services Company and not for Wallan
Al Wallan.
While it may be true that Wallan Al Wallan and petitioner met one another at its office,
respondent Skills International argues that this does not readily lead to the
conclusion that Wallan Al Wallan
was its accredited principal. As one of
its officers is from the
Anent
the medical examination which was undergone by petitioner, respondent Skills
International claims that it could not have possibly recommended him for such a
procedure as precisely, there was no job order as far as Wallan
Al Wallan’s company was concerned.
Respondent
Skills International also denies having facilitated petitioner’s deployment as
an alleged balik-manggagawa as petitioner’s Balik-Manggagawa Information Sheet does not indicate
the name of any local placement or recruitment agency. Moreover, on
The issue posed for Our resolution is whether or not the respondent agency (herein respondent) should be held liable for withholding worker’s salaries should be resolved in the negative. As discussed, complainant (herein petitioner) was hired directly by his employer and the respondent agency had no participation whatsoever in his overseas employment. Wanting in factual and legal [bases], the charged offense must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, let the instant case be, as it is hereby ordered DISMISSED
for lack of merit.[23]
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it must be stressed
that the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Skills International
could be held solidarily liable for the alleged
illegal dismissal of petitioner necessarily hinges on the primordial question
of whether respondent Skills International was the one responsible for his
deployment abroad. This indubitably
raises a question of fact which is not a proper subject of a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. It is
axiomatic that in an appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be
reviewed.[24]
The distinction between a question of
law and a question of fact was comprehensively discussed in the case of Microsoft
Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,[25] thus:
The distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact is settled. A
question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is
on a certain state of facts. A question
of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Though this delineation seems
simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
problematic. For example, it is incorrect
to presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve
purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.[26]
In this case, the issues brought
for our consideration calls for the re-examination of the evidence presented by
the parties and the determination of whether the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and
the Court of Appeals erred in their respective evaluation of the same. This we cannot do without blurring the
difference between a question of fact and a question of law – a significant
distinction as far as the remedy of appeal by certiorari is concerned.
Furthermore, factual findings of
administrative agencies that are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court.[27] This is so because of the special knowledge
and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial agencies from presiding over
matters falling within their jurisdiction.[28] So long as these factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not disturb the same.[29]
As earlier stated, in this case, the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals are unanimous in their factual
conclusions that Wallan Al Wallan
is not an accredited principal of respondent Skills International and we
sustain said findings. As aptly observed
by the NLRC –
In the instant case, the alleged
Employment Contract, Annex “A” for the complainant (herein petitioner) appears
to be one which is not perfected by herein parties, because said contract does
not bear the signatures of the respondents or any of their authorized
representatives. It only bears the
signature and thumbmark of the complainant. On its face, the Employment Contract readily
shows that respondent agency has neither participated nor is it a [privy] to
any party who executed the contract binding it to the terms and conditions of
the same.
Even in the Complainant’s Overseas
Employment Certificate No. 144592-A, the name of respondent agency does not
appear to be the one that recruited and deployed the complainant. Likewise, the Balikbayan
Info Sheet of complainant does not indicated that
herein respondent agency is the contracting agency in the
Complainant failed to submit evidence to disprove the allegations of the [respondents] that they neither participated in the contract of employment of complainant (Annex “A” for the complainant) nor were they privy to the terms and conditions appearing therein. The evidence submitted are not sufficient to hold respondent agency liable. The copy of the receipt for the alleged placement fee was not issued by the respondent agency but by the employer of complainant which is not its accredited principal – another fact which was never controverted by the complainant. This being the case, complainant has no cause of action against herein respondent and therefore, his money claims could not prosper in the instant case.
The Solidary Liability under Section [60] of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas and Filipino Act of 1995, will only apply if there is an existing valid contract and signed by the parties concerned.[30]
To this, we
add our own observations. Petitioner
insists that he does not qualify as a balik-manggagawa
as the term is defined under the law.
Nevertheless, it does not escape us that in his pleadings,[31] he
asserts that respondent Skills International handled his deployment as a balik-manggagawa to expedite his deployment
abroad. In addition, he never denied
having filled-up the entries in the Balik-Manggagawa
Information Sheet leaving the portion pertaining to the name of the
placement or recruitment agency blank. To
our mind, it is clear that petitioner utilizes the Balik-Manggagawa
program of the government whenever it is convenient for him. Thus, he availed himself of said program in
order to fast-track his deployment abroad and yet now that said Info Sheet is
being used against him, he claims that he could not have been processed as a balik-manggagawa as defined by law. We simply
cannot countenance such trifling regard for the law by awarding to petitioner
the money claims he is seeking in the present case.
As for the medical examination result
which petitioner belatedly presented before the Court of Appeals, the law
clearly requires that there should first be a job order relating to an existing
overseas position before a worker shall be subjected to a medical
examination. In this case, as petitioner
is the one insisting that a job order exists, he bears the burden of producing
the same. After all, the rule is settled
that he who alleges must prove.[32] Petitioner miserably failed to discharge this
burden.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now a member of this Court) and Elvi John S. Asuncion concurring; rollo, pp. 25-32.
[2] Dated
[3] Dated
[4] Records, p. 2.
[5]
[6]
[7] Position Paper dated
[8] Records, pp. 90-94.
[9]
[10] Rollo, p. 31.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] As amended in 1991.
[17] Rollo, p. 16.
[18] Annex “G” of the Petition; rollo, pp. 55-56.
[19] Citing Section 6, Rule II, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, as amended in 1991.
[20] Annex “F” of the Petition; rollo, p. 54.
[21] Republic Act No. 8042.
[22] Refers to POEA Case No. RV 97-10-0445; rollo, pp.124-127.
[23] Rollo, p. 127.
[24] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Santamaria, 443 Phil. 108, 119 (2003).
[25] G.R. No. 140946,
[26]
[27] Miralles
v. Go, G.R. No. 139943,
[28] Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 99357,
[29]
[30] Records, pp. 153-155.
[31] Memorandum of Appeal dated
[32] Bejoc
v. Cabreros, G.R. No. 145849,